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EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AS AN EXPLANATION 
OF THE EQUITY ISSUE PUZZLE 
 








The poor stock price performance of firms that raise capital through seasoned 
equity offerings is one of the recent puzzles in financial literature. In this study we 
investigate whether pre-issue earnings management can explain these results for rights 
issues in Spain. Consistent with this explanation, we notice that firms’ issuing rights 
make use of discretionary accruals to report higher earnings prior to the offering. Most 
interestingly, the decrease in discretionary accruals the years following the offering 
explains the underperformance in stock returns. 
 
 
JEL classification: G14; G32; M41. 
Keywords: Corporate Finance, Seasoned Equity Offerings, Earnings Management, 
Accounting Accruals.   2 
1.  Introduction 
One of the important anomalies in financial markets is the poor stock price 
performance following equity issues. Various studies have reported negative long-run 
abnormal returns up to five years after equity offerings. Loughran and Ritter (1995, 
1997), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Lee (1997) and Jegadeesh (2000) document 
this pattern for firm commitments offerings in the US market. The evidence for rights 
issues also reveals long-run post-issue underperformance: Cai (1998) and Kang, Kim 
and Stulz (1999) in Japan; Jeanneret (2000) in the French market; Stehle, Ehrhardt and 
Przyborowsky (2000) in Germany; and Pastor and Martín (2004) in Spain. 
One possible explanation is that directors of firms willing to issue equity manage 
earnings upward in order to increase the offering proceeds and the market fails to 
understand that the high earnings reported represent a transitory increase. In the years 
following the offering, negative abnormal returns would be due to a gradual correction 
of the initial overvaluation as earnings management reverses. In this  line of 
investigation, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998), Rangan (1998), Shivakumar (2000), 
Zhou and Elder (2003), and Heron and Lie (2004)  verify that firm commitment 
offerings in the US market are preceded by significant increases in abnormal accruals. 
Moreover, Teoh et al. (1998) and Rangan (1998) report a negative relationship between 
pre-offering abnormal accruals and post-offering stock returns. 
In relation to equity issues with rights, Heron and Lie (2004) find no evidence of 
earnings management prior to the offering in the US market. However, Ching, Firth and 
Rui (2002) in the Hong Kong market detect a negative relationship between pre-issue 
discretionary accruals and the abnormal return in the year following the issue of equity, 
although they do not analyse the time profile of earnings and accruals around the 
offering. 
In spite of the increasing concern by capital market regulators regarding the 
reliability and transparency of financial information provided by security issuers, the 
reality is that information asymmetry between managers and investors  does exist, 
allowing the former a certain amount of discretion when revealing this information to 
the market. Therefore, the study of equity offerings in which information asymmetry 
benefits the transfer of wealth through overstated earnings is a particularly relevant 
subject, which should be analysed in markets with different characteristics.  
Most previous studies have analysed firm commitment offerings from U.S. 
market and there is a distinct lack of research in countries with other characteristics. In 
this context, the Spanish stock market, where Pastor and Martín (2004) observe the   3 
equity offering anomaly for rights issues, provides an excellent opportunity to extend 
scientific community knowledge on this matter which clearly needs additional research. 
Thus, our research interest centres on whether managers display opportunistic 
behaviour when revealing earnings to potential equity subscribers around r ights 
offerings. A priori, we would expect managers to have lower incentives in earnings 
management in rights issues  since, in rights offerings, potential purchasers for new 
shares are basically current shareholders. Moreover, the degree of information 
asymmetry in the Spanish market should condition such manipulation.  
Additionally, g iven that the equity issue puzzle has been the subject of 
considerable debate in recent years, we would like to contribute to the growing body of 
literature that  aims to explain this anomaly, by analysing whether the use of 
discretionary accruals around equity offerings can explain the subsequent poor stock 
price performance. 
Consistent with this earnings management hypothesis, we note that issuers have 
unusually high accounting adjustments  in the year of the offering. Furthermore, the 
reversion in discretionary accruals in the post-issue period explains the long-run 
abnormal returns following the offering decision. This evidence implies that stock price 
underperformance is due, at least in part, to market inefficiency with respect to these 
accounting adjustments. 
The next section discusses measurements of earnings management. Section 3 
describes the sample selection procedure and data used. Section 4 analyses the accruals 
time profile from prior to post-issue date. Section 5 studies the relationship between 
earnings management and post-offering stock return underperformance. F inally, our 
conclusions are presented in section 6.  
 
2.   Measuring earnings management 
Accounting accruals are the centre point of earnings management tests. They are 
defined as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations, and cash-flow from operations. The accrual adjustments reflect business 
transactions that affect future cash-flows although cash has not currently changed hands. 
Under generally accepted accounting principles, firms have discretion to recognize 
these transactions  so  that reported earnings reflect the true underlying business 
conditions of the company. However, managerial flexibility in accruals also opens 
opportunities for earnings management.    4 
Because there is no standardized cash-flow statement in Spain, we decide to 
compute current accruals, which are related to non-cash working capital accounts. In 
order to calculate them, we use the normalized balance sheet presented in the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)
1. Specifically, in this study we utilize the 
standard definition of current accruals: 
( ) ( )  -  -  -  ititititit ACCCACASHCLSTD =DDDD                         (1) 
where ACCit are current accruals, DCAit is the change in current assets, DCASHit is the 
change in cash and cash equivalents,  DCLit  is the change in current liabilities, and 
DSTDit is the change in short-term debt. Subscripts i and t refers to company and period, 
respectively. 
We s hould point out that we employ  current accruals, leaving aside 
depreciations,  owing to the aggregation of accounts in the CNMV database.  In 
particular, the level of  gross property, plant and equipment, which is required as  a 
control variable in order to estimate normal depreciation, does not appear. Moreover, as 
we analyse the pattern of accruals around the offering,  it is  advisable to focus on 
processes with homogeneous reversion.   
Observable current accruals, ACCit, can theoretically be broken down into two 
unobservable components:  the nondiscretionary or normal part,  NACCit, and the 
abnormal component, AACCit, which can be used as a proxy for earnings management. 
Several theoretical models have attempted to obtain this break-down by estimating the 
pattern of accruals in the absence of accounting discretion. In particular, these models 
try to explain the part of accruals due to objective reasons such as accounting rules and 
the firm’s economic conditions. Thus, the part of accruals not explained by the model is 
considered discretional and used as a proxy for earnings management, since a variation 
in this component will represent a manager’s effort to manipulate earnings more than a 
change in exogenous economic conditions. 
In order to check the robustness of results, we apply two different models to 
estimate abnormal current accruals: the modified Jones model, proposed by Dechow, 
Sloan y Sweeney (1995),  which  has been used in  nearly all studies about earnings 
management; and the model developed by Poveda (2003), which, owing to the results 
achieved  regarding specification and power in  the  Spanish context,  along with the 
different methodology used in the estimation of abnormal accruals, make it an excellent 
alternative to confirm if results are due to model specification or the real existence of 
                                                 
1 This Spanish institution is the equivalent of the American S.E.C.   5 
earnings management. For the estimation of these two models, firstly we use a cross-
sectional approach and secondly a panel-data estimation procedure. 
 
2.1.   Cross-sectional approach 
Since current accruals are not homogeneous among different activity sectors, we 
estimate the coefficients of each model for each activity sector and year. The estimation 
sample in e ach cluster sector-year includes  exclusively  non-event  firms  requiring  a 
minimum of 10 observations. W ith these  estimated  coefficients “clear” of earnings 
management for each cluster sector-year, we “predict” the normal current accrual for 
issuing firms. We now describe in detail the estimation procedure of the two models. 
 
2.1.1.Modified Jones model in cross-section: 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) propose a modified version of the Jones 
(1991) model. Firstly, coefficients for each cluster sector-year are estimated with the 











                           (2) 
where j firms are non-event companies belonging to the same two digit activity sector 
of issuing firm i and the subscript s refers to the activity sector which the company i 
belongs to. ACCjt and DNSALESjt are current accruals and the change in net sales in year 
t for firm j, respectively. MTAjt is the mean total asset from year t-1 to year t for firm j. 
This intra-industry cross-sectional regression is estimated for each issuing firm i and 
year in the test period (from year -3 to +3 relative to year of the issue).  
Once the coefficients are estimated, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) suggest 
an adjustment in the original Jones model in order to avoid errors in the estimation of 
discretionary accruals when there is discretional behaviour through sales. With this 
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where AACCit is the abnormal component of current accruals and DTRit is the change in 
trade receivable for the issuing company i in year t. The subscript s refers to the activity 
sector which firm i belongs to. 
 
2.1.2. Poveda model in cross-section: 
Poveda (2003) proposes a new approach to estimate the abnormal component of 
current accruals. The main aim of his proposition is to avoid using potentially managed 
variables as  regressors,  such  as sales, mitigating the simultaneity problems 
characteristic in accruals estimations. In addition, he suggests a desegregate estimation 
in order to control the possibility of a different reaction in inventory, sales or purchases 
to the level of activity. With this idea,  coefficients for each cluster sector-year are 
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where j firms are non-event companies belonging to the same two digit activity sector 
of issuing firm i and the subscript s refers to the activity sector which the company i 
belongs to. NSALESjt is the value of net sales, MTAjt is the mean total active from year  
t-1 to year t, CFSjt is the cash-flow generated by sales and services, NPjt is the value of 
net purchases, CFPjt is the cash-flow generated by purchases and DINVENTjt is the 
inventory variation, for firm  j in year t.  Just like with the Jones model, this cross-
sectional regression is estimated for each issuing firm i and year in the test period (from 
year -3 to +3 relative to year of the issue). 
Then, the abnormal current accrual of offering firms is estimated as follows: 













     (5) 
 
The  Poveda (2003) model focuses  on  fundamental accruals related to 
accelerating the recognition of credit sales, and/or postponing the accounting of   7 
purchases, and/or the overvaluation of year-end inventory.  Therefore,  a  risk of 
manipulation is assumed in other working capital accounts, which is not detected by the 
model (type II error). However, as the model pays attention to accounts specifically 
controlled by the accruals models, the probability of a type I error is minimized, that is, 
the probability of detecting manipulation when there is none. We consider this aspect of 
the model to be highly appropriate in our context of detecting earnings management 
around equity offerings.  
 
2.2.   Panel-data approach. 
In order to check the robustness of results, we also include the estimation of the 
two models using panel data analysis, thus taking into account temporal patterns that 
can affect accrual components. In particular, we employ as estimation sample sector-
panels with  non-event f irms  requiring temporal series with a  minimum of  four 
observations. 
In addition to the simultaneity problem that arises if regressors are not 
orthogonal, which has been mitigated by the Poveda (2003) model by including cash-
flow explicative variables, we also had to bear in mind that, owing to the data employed 
in the area of earnings management, explicative variables would probably be correlated 
with regression residues. Thus, to avoid the  endogeneity problem, we introduce an 
unobservable heterogeneity component into the  panel-data  models. This  component 
enable us to control individual characteristics that are not observable, or not identified 
by investors, but which could be correlated with the residue employed as a proxy for 
discretion. So models are estimated with a fixed effects approach. 
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The variables are the same as in the cross-sectional approach, except for the 
introduction of the unobservable heterogeneity coefficients in each equation, and the 
year dummy variables  { } : 1991...2002 y DYy =  to identify possible changes in mean 
current accruals based on the economic cycle. Once the model is estimated using 
samples of sector-panels “clear” of earnings management, coefficients are used to 
“predict” the abnormal component, as we explained in the cross-sectional approach. 
 
3.   Sample and data sources 
In order to identify firms issuing equity, we use the CNMV register during the 
period from January 1991 to December 2002. As table 1 reports, 408 equity offerings of 
listed firms  are located. From this initial sample  an  exhaustive revision of relevant 
events in the CNMV is made in order to filter exclusively rights offerings for cash. In 
particular, we exclude offerings charged to reserves, equity to compensate credits or to 
convert bonds, equity issues as payments for employees, managers or clients and public 
offerings without subscription rights. Moreover, we do not consider equity issues to 
exchange  other companies’  stocks due to acquisition or merger processes,  or  the 
offerings of firms involved in these acquisition processes in the analysis period. 
Following the application of these filters, we are left with 119 rights offerings. We then 
filter out financial companies, because the nature of the accruals of these firms is very 
different from that of industrial firms. Hence the total sample is narrowed down to 99 
rights offerings. 
For inclusion in the final sample, we require accounting data in CNMV for the 
year of the offering and the previous year, because in order to estimate issuing firms’ 
accounting accruals we use variables in first differences. These exclusions further refine 
our sample down to 75 equity rights offerings during a period of 12 years, 1991-2002, 
and belonging to 10 sectors according to the two-digit sector classification in CNMV.    9 
 
TABLE 1.  
EVENT SAMPLE: SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS 1991-2002 
 
Seasoned Equity Offerings registered in CNMV 1991-2002   408 
Relevant events filter  (289) 
Rights Offerings for cash  119 
Financial companies   (20) 
Objective sample  99 
Non availability of accounting data   24 
FINAL SAMPLE  75 
 
The distribution of the event sample among sectors and years is illustrated in 
panel A of table 2. Five of the sample years (1991, 1993, 1994, 1998 and 1999) are 
more active and cover over 10% of the sample, with 1993 containing over 20% of the 
issues.  As for the distribution  among sectors, more than 50% of the rights issues 
correspond to three sectors: energy and water (14),  estate agents (13) and other 
manufacturing industries (17).  
 
TABLE 2. 
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION AMONG YEARS AND SECTORS 
 
S3: cement, glass and construction materials; S4: trade and other services; S5: construction industry; 
S6: energy and water; S8: chemistry industry; S9: estate agents; S11: basic metals; S12: new 
technologies; S15: other manufacturing industries; S17: metal manufacture. 
 
Panel A. Event Sample 
sector  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total 
S3  1  0  3  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  5 
S4  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  7 
S5  0  0  2  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  4 
S6  1  1  1  3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  14 
S8  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  3 
S9  2  0  3  2  0  0  1  2  2  0  0  1  13 
S11  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  3 
S12  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  4 
S15  2  1  3  2  1  0  2  1  1  1  1  2  17 
S17  2  0  2  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  5 
Total  8  3  16  9  4  2  5  8  9  4  2  5  75 
Panel B. Estimation sample 
Sector  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total 
S3  7  12  17  17  16  17  16  15  13  11  10  8  159 
S4  5  5  27  24  23  20  21  20  21  18  18  17  219 
S5  5  9  9  11  9  9  7  8  7  8  8  9  99 
S6  17  17  28  22  27  26  23  23  16  15  17  14  245 
S8  5  9  12  11  9  10  10  5  4  4  4  3  86 
S9  6  13  46  49  52  46  44  40  38  33  36  34  437 
S11  6  6  15  12  13  11  11  12  9  10  7  7  119 
S12  3  4  5  5  5  5  6  4  6  4  9  10  66 
S15  15  26  58  54  56  54  52  51  52  47  47  42  554 
S17  12  18  45  48  45  35  32  29  26  24  26  21  361 
Total  81  119  262  253  255  233  222  207  192  174  182  165  2345   10 
As we explained in section two, in order to estimate the normal component of 
accruals we need an estimation sample made up of “non-event firms”. To achieve more 
robustness in results, we regard as “non-event firms” companies that do not issue equity 
even they are not in the final sample of 75 due to conversions, mergers etc., since they 
could contaminate the coefficients estimation. The estimation samples are taken from 
the panel illustrated in panel B of table 2 for the 10 sectors and 12 years covered in this 
study.   
 
4.   Accruals pattern around the time of the offering 
In this section, firstly we analyse the time profile of current accruals in the years 
surrounding the equity issue. Secondly, we apply the models described in section two to 
extract the abnormal component of current accruals as a proxy  for earnings 
management. 
 
4.1.   Current accruals around the issue of equity. 
As a first approximation, h ere, we  examine the pattern of current accruals 
without getting into the estimation of the normal component and regardless of the 




CURRENT ACCRUALS AROUND EQUITY OFFERINGS 
 
N: number of observations; acc: current mean accruals for event firms; pv acc: p-value in testing 
the null hypothesis of current accruals equal zero; e1acc: mean excess in current accruals of event 
firms in relation to non-event control firms selected by size for the same cluster sector-year; pv 
e1acc: p-value in testing the equality in means between event and size control firms; e2acc: mean 
excess in current accruals of event firms in relation to the median of non-event firms for the same 
cluster sector-year; pv e2acc: p -value in testing the equality between event firms and sector 
medians. All accruals measures are deflated by mean total active. 
 
  N  acc  pv acc  e1acc  pv e1acc  e2acc  pv e2acc 
year -3  32  -0.0593  0.8928  -0.0768  0.2534  -0.0554  0.3946 
year -2  38  -0.0576  0.7185  -0.1132  0.0381  -0.0669  0.1817 
year -1  47  0.0102  0.1025  0.0097  0.7812  0.0123  0.6284 
event year  75  0.0587  0.0103  0.0553  0.0633  0.0558  0.0136 
year +1  50  -0.0073  0.5890  0.0072  0.8259  0.0125  0.4277 
year +2  49  0.0001  0.5452  -0.0263  0.2431  -0.0050  0.8296 
year +3  48  -0.0398  0.2885  -0.0453  0.1254  -0.0340  0.1392   11 
If we focus on event firms’ current accruals (acc), we  notice as they are 
monotonically  increasing to a peak in the offering year and decreasing thereafter. 
Specifically, current accruals increase gradually from a negative value of -0.0593 in the 
three years prior to the offering to a positive value of 0.0587 in the event year. As for 
the statistical significance of this pattern, p-values decrease progressively from 89.28% 
in year -3 to 1.03% in the event year which allows the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
zero current accruals in the offering year nearly at a 1% statistical level. In the years 
following the offering, there is a sharp reversion in the first post-issue year with current 
accruals practically zero (-0.0073) with a high p-value (58.9%), indicating that they are 
not statistically different from zero.  
In order to control temporal effects on this profile regarding the specific year in 
which the offering is made, or related to isolated sector patterns, we also analyse the 
performance of current accruals in relation to control non-event samples. With this aim 
in mind, and in order to ensure the robustness of results, control firms are selected 
following two alternative criteria. 
Firstly, for each event firm we select as a control firm the non-event company in 
the same sector-year that is closest in size
2. Thus, the variable “e1acc” measures the 
excess in the same sector-year of offerings firms’ current accruals in relation to non-
event firms of a similar size. The pattern of this adjusted variable starts with negative 
values (-0.0768 and -0.1132) indicating that event firms’ current accruals are lower than 
those for non-event firms. However, in the year prior to the offering, the sign changes 
rising to a peak (0.0553) in the offering year. These adjusted current accruals decline in 
the post-issue years, and are once again negative in the second and third year following 
the offering. Thus, the time profile of adjusted accruals is very similar to results 
observed without adjustment. 
Regarding the statistical significance, the only two years with reasonably low p-
values are year -2 and year 0. Concretely, two years before the offering, event firms 
have a level of current accruals lower than control firms by 0.1132 with a p-value of 
3.81%. However, in the issuing year the level of event firms’ current accruals exceeds 
their control companies by 0.0553 with a statistical p-value of 6.3%. These results are 
consistent with an effort made by offering firms to improve their results in the issue 
year through accounting accruals. 
Secondly, adjusted accruals are computed  by  controlling the median of non-
event firms in the same cluster sector-year. Thus, the variable “e2acc” measures the 
                                                 
2 For this selection the firm size is measured as the mean total asset from year t-1 to year t.   12 
excess in the same sector-year of offerings firms’ current accruals in relation to the non-
event sector medians. Observing the time profile of e2acc, the highest level is reached in 
the event year with an excess of 0.0558 statistically significant at a 1.36% level. If we 
focus on the years before or after the offering, the pattern of adjusted accruals reflects 
once again an increase up until the offering year, and a decline thereafter. Moreover, 
only  in  the years  -1, 0 and +1 are  event firms’ current accruals higher than sector 
medians, the peak being in the offering year.  
For a better  understanding of the results in table 3 ,  we  have  represented 
graphically the time profile of row current accruals and adjusted ones. In particular, 
figure 1 shows how the performance of accruals around the issue of equity matches the 
earnings management hypothesis perfectly. In the three years prior to the offering there 
is a clear and progressive rise reaching a peak in event year. Subsequently, there is a 
clear reversion with a sharp decrease in the first year after the event, and the decline 
continues, although gently, until the third post-offering year. Moreover, we can see the 
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acc: current accruals for event firms
e1acc: excess in current accruals for event firms in relation to size control firms
e2acc: excess in current accruals for event firms in relation to sector medians
   13 
4.2.   Abnormal accruals analysis. 
In previous section we identified that issuing firms’ current accruals reach the 
highest level in the event year and, moreover, in this year they are higher than non-event 
companies.  These results  seem to indicate that accruals are being manipulated by 
issuing firms in order to increase reported results in the offering year. However, this 
begs the question: will this pattern  hold if we apply formal models to break down 
accruals into  their  normal and abnormal components? We  attempt to answer this 
question using the estimation of the models presented in section 2, both in a cross-
section approach and  via  panel-data analysis. Table 4  shows the performance of 
abnormal accruals estimated with the different procedures proposed. 
If we focus on abnormal current accruals (aacc) around the year of the offering, 
we notice that the highest level of this variable occurs in the event year regardless of the 
model used. Moreover, in every panel this maximum is supported by p-values, which 
allow us to reject the absence of earnings management. 
Panel A shows results with the modified Jones model in cross-section. We 
observed a clear rise in manipulation proxy in the issue year reaching a value of 0.0436 
with a statistical p-value around 5%. When this model is estimated using a sector panel-
data, panel B, the abnormal component also rises to a peak in the event year with a 
value of 0.0887 and a statistical p-value below 2%. Thus, the results achieved when 
applying this model to estimate abnormal accruals indicate that issuing firms make use 
of discretion to overstate earnings in the offering year,  and discretionary accruals 
around this date are significantly high.   
The best way of checking the robustness of these results is  by utilizing a 
different accruals break-down approach, so we can verify that the results are not due to 
model specification. The alternative model is proposed by Poveda (2003) and its results 
with cross-section estimation are shown in panel C. We notice the same pattern as the 
modified Jones model with a maximum in the event year of 0.0458 and a very  low 
statistical p-value of 0.2%. Finally in panel D, applying the Poveda model with panel-
data, the highest level of abnormal component again occurs in the event-year with a 
value of 0.0582 and a statistical p-value of 2%.  
In short, the results confirm the existence of manipulation related to the equity 
offering decision. In particular, given that abnormal accruals are deflated by mean total 
assets, values are in terms of ROA (return on assets), implying that economic returns in 
the offering year can include an abnormal component around five points, ranging 
between 4.36% and 8.87% depending on the model employed.   14 
TABLE 4. 
ABNORMAL CURRENT ACCRUALS AROUND THE OFFERING 
 
N: number of observations; aacc: mean abnormal current accruals for event firms; pv acc: p-value in 
testing the null hypothesis of abnormal current accruals equal zero; e1aacc: mean excess in abnormal 
current accruals of event firms in relation to non-event control firms selected by size for the same 
cluster sector-year; pv e1aacc: p-value in testing the equality in means between event and size control 
firms; e2aacc: mean excess in abnormal current accruals of event firms in relation to the median of 
non-event firms for the same sector-year; pv e2aacc: p-value in testing the equality between event 
firms and sector medians. All abnormal accruals measures are deflated by mean total active. 
 
  N  aacc   pv aacc  e1aacc   pv e1aacc  e2aacc   pv e2aacc 
Panel A. Modified Jones model in cross-section 
year -3  16  -0.1210  0.5485  -0.0058  0.9493  -0.1313  0.2165 
year -2  16  -0.1437  0.2320  -0.0832  0.1183  -0.1525  0.1114 
year -1  24  -0.0224  0.3374  -0.0262  0.6634  -0.0266  0.3610 
event year  48  0.0436  0.0552  0.0330  0.4528  0.0388  0.0945 
year +1  27  0.0241  0.1342  0.0548  0.2250  0.0180  0.3282 
year +2  25  -0.0050  0.7424  -0.0349  0.3938  -0.0114  0.6152 
year +3  26  -0.0275  0.5604  -0.0314  0.4135  -0.0345  0.1768 
Panel B. Modified Jones model with panel-data 
year -3  24  -0.0455  0.9258  -0.0733  0.2501  -0.0538  0.3633 
year -2  26  -0.0538  0.7034  -0.0965  0.1021  -0.0526  0.3058 
year -1  33  -0.0189  0.2332  -0.0184  0.6023  -0.0239  0.2362 
event year  45  0.0887  0.0194  0.0591  0.1869  0.0862  0.0222 
year +1  38  0.0363  0.0037  0.0044  0.8810  0.0364  0.0849 
year +2  37  0.0485  0.0132  0.0114  0.6517  0.0488  0.0387 
year +3  37  0.0198  0.1467  0.0181  0.5264  0.0111  0.6447 
Panel C. Poveda model in cross-section 
year -3  16  -0.0720  0.7579  -0.0327  0.6396  -0.0768  0.2667 
year -2  16  -0.0658  0.7244  -0.0380  0.1674  -0.0677  0.2644 
year -1  24  -0.0176  0.4179  -0.0342  0.3426  -0.0167  0.4851 
event year  48  0.0458  0.0022  0.0547  0.0382  0.0444  0.0023 
year +1  27  0.0138  0.1991  0.0017  0.9588  0.0143  0.3676 
year +2  25  0.0134  0.1762  -0.0294  0.2578  0.0116  0.3661 
year +3  26  -0.0049  0.8358  -0.0164  0.5412  -0.0026  0.8546 
Panel D. Poveda model with panel-data 
year -3  24  -0.0139  0.6462  -0.0124  0.7987  -0.0209  0.5523 
year -2  26  -0.0313  0.9484  -0.0860  0.0802  -0.0329  0.2842 
year -1  33  -0.0098  0.1879  -0.0122  0.6899  -0.0065  0.6695 
event year  45  0.0582  0.0200  0.0465  0.1516  0.0565  0.0154 
year +1  38  0.0155  0.0318  -0.0110  0.6727  0.0077  0.5130 
year +2  37  0.0191  0.0254  -0.0066  0.7857  0.0062  0.6066 
year +3  37  0.0070  0.2496  0.0118  0.6129  -0.0075  0.6391 
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Next, we employ control firms to measure the excess in event firms’ abnormal 
accruals in relation to companies of a similar size in the same sector-year. Again these 
adjusted abnormal accruals are highest in the event year, showing an excess in abnormal 
accruals for event firms  in comparison to non-event companies  in the year of the 
offering around 0.05. However, they are only statistically significant with the Poveda 
model in cross-section. With this model in particular, during the three years prior to the 
offering, event firms’ abnormal accruals are lower than those for non-event companies. 
Nevertheless, in the event year there is an excess of 0.0547 with a p-value of 3.82%, 
confirming the difference between issuers and non-issuers. The excess in the first post-
issue year is also positive,  and then  negative  again for the second and third year 
following the offering.     
Finally, comparing event firms’ abnormal accruals with the median for non-
issuers in the same cluster sector-year, results once again display the same pattern. In all 
panels we observe how abnormal accruals for event-firms in the year of the offering are 
higher than sector medians; in all cases these differences are statistically significant.  
In panel A, with the modified Jones model in cross-section, we observe how, in 
the year of the offering, there is an excess of 0.0388 statistically significant at a 10% 
level. In panel B,  using  a panel-data approach  to estimate the same model, the 
difference reaches a value of 0.0862 with a p-value of 2.22%, thus rejecting the equality 
between issuers  and their sector medians.  The Poveda model  provided similar 
conclusions. In panel C, with the model in cross-section, the excess in the event year is 
0.0444 with a p-value of 2.4%, while with the panel-data methodology the excess in 
abnormal accruals reaches a value of 0.0565 with a p-value of 1.54%. Thus, in both 
cases there is clear evidence of  issuing firms’ presenting abnormal accruals that are 
significantly higher than non-issuers in the same sector-year. 
Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the performance of the abnormal 
accruals analyzed in this section, showing the time profile for the mean of the four 
abnormal accruals estimations (Jones in cross-section, Jones with panel-data, Poveda in 
cross-section and Poveda with panel-data).  In this  figure we can  see how raw and 
adjusted abnormal accruals experience a gradual increase before the offering, reaching a 
peak in the event year and declining afterwards, consistent with the reversion of 
previous manipulation. 
In conclusion, we can say that results point out to the existence of manipulation 
accounting practices to overstate reported earnings around the issue of equity. In this 
context, the new question is if these practices have any relation with the stock price 
underperformance suffered by equity issuers  in the years following this decision. In   16 
other words, do abnormal accruals lead to issuers’ overvaluation, which is gradually 
corrected by the market in the post-offering period, thus causing underperformance? 
 
FIGURE 2. 
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aacc: mean abnormal current accruals for event firms
e1aacc: excess in aacc for event firms in relation to size control firms




5.   Predicting post-issue stock returns  through pre-issue earnings 
management 
In this section, firstly we examine the long-run performance of post-issue stock 
returns and next we  try to discern if there is a relationship between the earnings 
management practices detected in previous section and post-offering stock  price 
performance. 
 
5.1.   Post-issue stock returns performance. 
We measure the long-run market reaction to equity rights issues, by applying 
two alternative procedures. Firstly, we compute abnormal returns in the years following 
the offering with an event time analysis and, secondly, we employ a calendar time 
methodology.   17 
We need stock price information from the  Servicio de Interconexión de las 
Bolsas Españolas (SIBE) in order to compute monthly returns in the three year post-
issue period. Since stock prices are available till 2003, the sample used in the analysis of 
event time  returns  ends in  the  year 2000. Likewise, in order to avoid  cross-section 
dependence, we do not allow the analysis periods of the same firm to overlap. Thus, the 
sample employed in the analysis of event time returns following the issue of equity 
included 57 rights issues. 
In the event-time analysis to measure long-run performance following the equity 
offering, we use returns net of the returns to the market value-weighted portfolio
3. In 
particular, we calculate the abnormal return of company i in the post-offering period 
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where  it R   and  Mt R are the returns of firm  i and the market portfolio in month  t, 
respectively, and t  is the number of months in the post-offering period analyzed. 
  The market index is the most widely-used reference portfolio when computing 
adjusted returns; however this alternative does not control the cross-section variability 
of mean returns. To address this question, regressions in the following section aiming to 
explain the long-run abnormal returns will include, as control variables, the firm’s size 
and its book to market ratio
4. 
Figure 3 shows the mean abnormal compound return for the event sample during 
the 36 months following the offering decision. We observe how adjusted returns are 
positive up until the third month following the equity issue. After that, abnormal returns 
experience a very sharp decrease until the two-year post-issue period. During the third 
post-offering year abnormal returns continue to decline but more gently. 
 
                                                 
3 Results are very similar using equally weighted market portfolio returns. 
4 Empirical evidence has demonstrated that the size and book to market ratio explain the cross-section 
variability of stock returns.   18 
FIGURE 3. 
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Next we test the statistical significance of this abnormal returns performance. 
Addressing this topic  involves the use of appropriate methodology to minimize the 
specification problems which arise when testing abnormal returns in long horizon 
periods. Kothari and Warner (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) proved that the 
bootstrap procedure has fewer misspecification problems and they consider it to be an 
appropriate methodology to test the existence of long-run abnormal returns.  
Thus, we compute traditional t statistic but we apply the bootstrap procedure to 
simulate its empirical distribution and we use this distribution to fix the acceptance and 





=                                                    (9) 
where  N  is the number of events in the sample (N  = 57),  AACoR is the average 
abnormal compound return and  ˆ s  is the cross-sectional standard deviation. 
In order to obtain the empirical distribution of statistic t we randomly select 
replacement B subsamples with  b N  events from the original sample, and for each 
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where  b AACoR  and  ˆ b s are the mean and standard deviation of the subsample  b, 
1,2,... bB = . Then, if  B  is high enough from the sample of bootstrap statistics 
} { :1,2,... b tbB =  we can obtain the empirical distribution of statistic  t and use this 
distribution to fix the acceptance and rejection regions. This methodology  is applied 
with  10.000 B =  and  b NN = . 
Table 5 reports average abnormal compound returns for the one, two and three-
year post-issue period. As figure 1 illustrated, market adjusted returns are negative. For 
the first year following the issue of equity the mean abnormal return of offering firms is 
-13.19%, getting worse the larger the temporal horizon. In particular, adjusted returns 
have a mean of -19.25% and -24.70% for the two and three-year post-issue period. 
Table 5 also shows the results of traditional t test applying the bootstrap technique to 
compute statistical significance. Negative abnormal returns are highly significant 
whatever the horizon analyzed.  
When reference portfolios are employed to estimate normal returns, in our case 
the market portfolio, the distribution of long-run abnormal returns is positively skewed. 
We can see in Table 5 that skewness coefficients are positive and they increase with the 
temporal horizon analyzed. This positive skewness could lead to misspecified  t 
statistics, so, to avoid this problem we also calculate the skewness-adjusted t statistic 
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To compute the statistical significance of the skewness-adjusted t we also apply 
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where  ˆb g  is the skewness coefficient of the subsample b,  10.000 B =  and  b NN = .   20 
TABLE 5. 
STOCK RETURN PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING THE ISSUE 
 
Panel A shows the mean abnormal compound return for issuing firms in the one, two and three-year post-
issue period. This panel also reports results of traditional t test and skewness-adjusted t test using the 
bootstrap technique to evaluate statistical significance. Panel B shows the abnormal monthly mean return 
in the post-offering period estimated with the Fama-French model in calendar-time regressions.  
 
Panel A. Abnormal compound return in the post-offering period. 
Year after 
the SEO 










+1  -13.19%  -2.94  (0.00)  0.00  -2.94  (0.01) 
+2  -19.25%  -3.14  (0.00)  0.11  -3.09  (0.00) 
+3  -24.70%  -3.01  (0.01)  0.43  -2.83  (0.00) 
Panel B. Abnormal monthly mean return with Fama-French model in calendar-time regressions 
ˆ p a  (%)  t statistic  p-value         
-0.72 %  -2.15  (0.03)         
 
Results in table 5  show that even controlling possible bias due to positive 
skewness, negative abnormal returns are highly significant. Thus, we can conclude that 
issuing firms experience negative abnormal returns in the three years following the 
issue of equity. 
Given the different problems that arise when we accumulate returns over long 
periods
5, an alternative procedure to estimate and test post-offering long-run abnormal 
returns is to analyse the abnormal monthly mean return by applying a calendar time 
portfolio approach. This methodology analyses the monthly return of buying the stock 
on the event date and holding it for t  months. In other words, this approach examines 
the strategy of holding a portfolio which is made up, in each calendar month, of the 
stocks affected by the event over the last  t  months. T herefore, by studying this 
portfolio’s return indirectly we can analyse the return of the stocks affected by the event 
over the following t  months. This calendar time methodology enables us to check the 
robustness of results, to avoid problems of accumulating returns over long periods and, 
what is more, we can use the sample of 75 events.  
For the purpose of a clearer understanding of the calendar-time portfolio 
methodology, we have represented it in Figure 4. The first month where an equity issue 
occurs is February 1991, so the strategy consists of buying the issue stock in this month 
and holding it for t  months. In our case, t  will be 36 months since we want to study 
the issuing firm’s return in the three year post-issue period. 
                                                 
5 Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Lyon, Barber and Tsay (1999).   21 
In the same way, if April 1991 is the next month where another equity offering 
occurs,  we acquire a  second issue stock that month and  also  hold it  36 months. 
Similarly, June 1991 is the next month with another equity issue, so we buy the third 
issue stock that month and hold it for 36 months. Therefore, in June 1991 the portfolio 
is made up of the three stocks of the firms that issued equity in February, April and 
June, respectively. 
Thus, we can compute the monthly return of the calendar portfolio p in each 
month t as: 
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where  jt R  is the return of firm j in month t ,  pt N  is the number of stocks that are in the 
portfolio that month t. Thus, we obtain the time series of the calendar portfolio monthly 
returns from February 1991 (the first equity issue in our sample) to December 
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To measure and test the portfolio’s abnormal monthly mean return we apply the 
Fama and Frech (1993) three factor model to the time series of the portfolio’s monthly 
returns. Then, we run the following time series regression:  
123 ()+      t=02/91,...,12/03 ptftppMtftptptpt RRRRHMLSMB abbbe -=+￿-++        (14)       
where  ft R  is the one-month Treasury bill (risk free) rate of return,  t HML  is the 
difference in returns between portfolios made up of stocks with high and low book-to-
market ratio and  t SMB  is the difference in returns between portfolios made up of stocks 
with  high and low trading volumes, both orthogonalized. The Jensen’s  alpha,  p a , 
measures the calendar-time portfolio’s abnormal monthly mean return.  
This calendar-time approach, advocated by Fama (1998),  corrects for possible 
correlations of returns across events and  minimizes  the skewness problem  since 
monthly returns of portfolios are used. Furthermore, the Fama and Frech (1993) model 
takes into account the explicative power of size and book-to-market ratio in the cross-
sections of stock returns.  However,  this procedure is not free  from possible b iases; 
several prior studies have documented that the application of the Fama-French model to 
test the existence of abnormal returns presents specification problems
6.  In addition, 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) argued that this factor model is less powerful in detecting 
abnormal returns than abnormal compound return analysis. In spite of these possible 
biases, the  calendar-time approach  provides an alternative  for analyzing  the post-
offering abnormal long-run returns which is useful to check the robustness of results 
obtained in panel A of table 5. 
Panel B of table 5 reports the results of the Fama-French calendar-time regression. 
Given that the change in the composition of the portfolio each month could lead to 
heteroskedasticity problems, since the variance depends on the number of firms in the 
portfolio, we estimated the regression using White’s covariance estimator, consistent 
with heteroskedasticity. The intercept from the Fama-Frech model,  p a , which measures 
the abnormal monthly mean return of the calendar portfolio is negative and significant 
with a p-value of 3%. Bearing in mind how we construct the calendar portfolio, its 
return measures the return of the stocks affected by the  equity  offering  over the 
following 36 months. Thus, results indicate that the abnormal monthly mean return of 
offerings firms in the three year post-issue period is statistically negative which is 
consistent with the negative abnormal compound returns illustrated in panel A.  
                                                 
6  Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), Jegadeesh (2000) and Brav, Greczy and Gompers (2000).   23 
5.2.   Earnings management and post-offering stock underperformance. 
We would now like to turn our attention to the question of whether the poor 
post-issue stock return performance can be explained by pre-issue earnings 
management. In order to do this, we first examine the relationship between abnormal 
compound returns and the change in earnings following the issue  by  regressing the 
following equation: 
123 ioiii ACoREBXISIZEBTM tt bbbbm =+D+++                      (15) 
where i ACoRt  is the abnormal compound return of company i in period t , t  being the 
one, two and three year-period following the offering.  i EBXI t D  is the change in 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations of firm i in period t  
and it is the explanatory variable of interest.  Furthermore, we included as control 
variables the firms’ size,  i SIZE  and the book-to-market ratio, i BTM
7, owing to their 
explicative power in the cross-section variability of stock returns. 
If the decline in stock prices following the offering is due to a gradual correction 
of market expectations as earnings reverse, a positive relationship between adjusted 
returns in the post-offering period and the change in earnings would be expected. Panel 
A of table 6 shows coefficients estimations of this first regression as well as their p-
values in brackets. The lack of accounting information in some years  entailed the 
reduction of the event sample. We estimate the regression for each temporal horizon 
with the number of events, N, with information available to compute the change in 
earnings. 
For the one-year post-issue period, the coefficient on  EBXI D  is 2.017, with a 
statistical p -value of 3.6%.  Therefore, a decrease in earnings implies a decline in 
abnormal returns of more than double. When we focus on adjusted returns during the 
two-year post-offering period, the coefficient of  EBXI D  is also positive with a value of 
2.305 and in this case significant at 1% level. Thus, results for the two-year post-
offering period also confirm the significant positive relationship between the decline in 
earnings and the decrease in returns. Finally,  the  results  obtained when  analysing 
abnormal compound returns for the three-year period following the issue  are also 
consistent with this positive relationship, although it seems that with this longer 
                                                 
7 The firm size was measured as market capitalization in millions of euros and the book to market ratio 
was the book value of stocks relative to the firm size. Both variables were computed for each firm at the 
beginning of the offering year. 
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temporal horizon the positive relationship is less pronounced. The level of statistical 
significance in this particular case is 10%.  
In general,  the  results  of regression (15) indicate that there is a significant 
relationship between poor post-issue stock return performance and the decrease in 
earnings during the one, two and three-year period following the offering, which is 
consistent with investors correcting expectations as earnings reverse. 
 
TABLE 6. 
PREDICTING POST-ISSUE STOCK RETURNS WITH CHANGE IN EARNINGS 
 
Panel A shows results of the regression analysis to study the relationship between the return 
underperformance and the decrease in earnings in the post-offering period. The dependent variable is the 
abnormal compound return,  ACoR , in the one, two and three-year period following the issue. The 
independent variable,  EBXI D , is the change in earnings in the analysis period. We also included as 
explicative control variables the SIZE of the firm and its BTM ratio. In panel B, the explicative variable 
EBXI D is  broken d own into: change in cash-flow from operations,  ?CF, and change in current 
accruals, ?ACC. 
 
Dependent variable  One-year AcoR  Two-year AcoR  Three-year AcoR 
Panel A. Regression of AcoR on change in earnings. 
INTERCEPT  -0.207   (0.009)  -0.312   (0.002)  -0.204   (0.128) 
  EBXI D   2.017   (0.036)  2.305   (0.005)  1.552   (0.088) 
SIZE  1.97E-5   (0.155)  6.06E-5   (0.001)  4.44E-5   (0.057) 
BTM  0.075   (0.236)  0.060   (0.449)  -0.123   (0.247) 
N  54  52  48 
2 R   0.149  0.298  0.146 
2 adj R   0.098  0.254  0.088 
Panel B Regression of AcoR on change in cash-flow and current accruals. 
INTERCEPT  -0.194   (0.015)  -0.294   (0.004)  -0.149   (0.284) 
?CF  2.061   (0.032)  2.363   (0.004)  1.537   (0.090) 
?ACC  2.316   (0.021)  2.636   (0.003)  1.930   (0.045) 
SIZE  2.03E-5   (0.141)  6.03E-5   (0.001)  4.42E-5   (0.056) 
BTM  0.073   (0.250)  0.054   (0.493)  -0.154   (0.160) 
N  54  52  48 
2 R   0.169  0.319  0.175 
2 adj R   0.102  0.261  0.098 
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We know that earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
can be broken down into cash-flow from operations and current accruals, which are 
accounting adjustments that do not imply a movement of cash. With this idea in mind, 







=+D+D+++ 144424443            (16) 
where  i CFt D and  i ACC t D are the changes in cash-flow and accounting accruals for firm 
i in period t , respectively. 
Panel B of table 6 reports the results of regression (14). For the one-year period 
following the offering both the coefficient on cash-flow and total accruals are 
statistically positive at 5% level. Thus, it seems that the decline in returns in the year 
following the issue is explained not only by the change in cash-flow but also by the 
decrease in accounting accruals. In relation to abnormal returns during the two-year 
post-offering period, this positive relationship between adjusted returns and change in 
accounting accruals is even more pronounced, with a coefficient of 2.636 statistically 
positive at 1% level. Finally, when the analysis horizon is the three-year period, results 
also confirm the positive relationship between the decrease in returns and the decline in 
total accounting adjustments, which is significant at 5%. Therefore, we can conclude 
that negative abnormal returns in the years following the offering are due, at least in 
part, to the reversion in accounting accruals. 
As we explain previously, current accruals can be divided into nondiscretionary 
adjustments and discretionary or abnormal accruals, which can be used as a proxy for 
earnings management. Since the main objective of this study  is to detect if the 
overvaluation and subsequent underperformance of equity issuers  is due to previous 
earnings management, our major interest is to discover if abnormal returns are predicted 
by reversion in the part of accounting accruals that are “managed”. 
In order to do this, in regression (16) we broke down the explanatory variable 
accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary adjustments.  For this process, we 
applied the estimation procedures described above, firstly the modified Jones (1991) 
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where  i AACCt D  is the change in discretionary or abnormal accruals and  i NACCt D is the 
variation in the nondiscretionary or normal component of accruals, for firm i in period 
t , respectively.  
As we have  already  explained, the  abnormal accrual component is the key 
explanatory variable, since it is a proxy  for managerial manipulation. If the market 
understands the implications of these discretionary adjustments, the coefficient on 
i AACCt D  will be zero. However, if investors misinterpret these accounting practices, 
believing that high earnings due to discretionary accruals reflect good expectations, they 
overvalue equity issuers and  gradually  correct this overvaluation as discretionary 
accruals reverse in the post-offering period. So, according to this argument a positive 
relationship would be expected between abnormal returns and the decrease in 
discretionary accruals. We must point out that this earnings management hypothesis 
does not predict any relationship between the decrease in returns and nondiscretionary 
accruals, since they are dictated by firm conditions and are outside the control of 
managerial manipulation. 
Table 7 displays the results of regression (17) with the four models employed to 
estimate discretionary accounting adjustments. The  lack of  certain information to 
estimate these variables  entailed the reduction of the event sample. We run each 
regression with the number of events, N, with enough information to estimate abnormal 
accruals. When we focus on the one-year post-issue period, the coefficient of the change 
in abnormal accruals,?AACC, is statistically positive whatever the procedure used to 
estimated discretionary adjustments. Specifically, the value of this coefficient is about 
2.6, confirming that the reversion in discretionary accruals implies a decline in returns, 
in particular, of more than double.  
With regards the nondiscretionary accruals, this variable is only significant in 
explaining abnormal returns when the Poveda model in cross-section is  used  as  an 
estimation procedure. Given that the nondiscretionary part of accruals does not reflect 
manipulation, the earnings management hypothesis does not predict any relationship; 
however, the fact  that  one of the estimation procedures  produced a significant 
relationship does not go against the manipulation hypothesis. This could be down to the 
fact that this model does not distinguish properly between the discretionary and 
nondiscretionary part of accounting accruals, or even because the market also reacts to 
reversion in nondiscretionary accruals. 
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TABLE 7. 
PREDICTING POST-ISSUE STOCK RETURNS WITH DISCRETIONARY 
ACCRUALS 
With the regression analysis in this table, we studied the relationship between post-offering returns and 
abnormal accruals,?AACC . To estimate these accounting adjustments we  used the modified Jones 
model and the Poveda model in cross-section and with panel-data, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable  One-year ACoR  Two-year ACoR  Three-year ACoR 
Panel A. Modified Jones model in cross-section 
INTERCEPT  -0.242   (0.039)  -0.245   (0.131)  -0.080   (0.775) 
?CF  1.992   (0.087)  3.100  (0.029)  0.366  (0.885) 
?AACC   2.593   (0.036)  3.735  (0.018)  1.267  (0.671) 
?NACC  2.181   (0.123)  2.613  (0.124)  0.754  (0.778) 
SIZE  1.54E-5   (0.295)  6.22E-5  (0.004)  3.90E-5  (0.222) 
BTM  0.133   (0.199)  -0.015  (0.911)  -0.259  (0.292) 
N  29  28  26 
2 R   0.339  0.445  0.173 
2 adj R   0.196  0.318  -0.033 
Panel B. Modified Jones model with panel data 
INTERCEPT  -0.254   (0.015)  -0.353   (0.013)  -0.266   (0.198) 
?CF  2.085  (0.068)  2.773  (0.038)  -1.729  (0.449) 
?AACC   2.565  (0.039)  3.225  (0.036)  -1.533  (0.560) 
?NACC  1.909  (0.123)  2.491  (0.109)  -0.382  (0.862) 
SIZE  1.58E-5 (0.301)  6.47E-5  (0.003)  3.37E-5  (0.256) 
BTM  0.088  (0.299)  0.071  (0.532)  -0.037  (0.835) 
N  36  36  34 
2 R   0.227  0.344  0.138 
2 adj R   0.098  0.235  -0.016 
Panel C. Poveda model in cross-section 
INTERCEPT  -0.254   (0.033)  -0.305   (0.065)  -0.168   (0.485) 
?CF  2.233   (0.052)  3.827  (0.012)  0.680  (0.758) 
?AACC   2.869   (0.028)  3.398  (0.028)  0.182  (0.940) 
?NACC  2.715   (0.040)  4.781  (0.009)  2.558  (0.325) 
SIZE  1.45E-5  (0.329)  6.52E-5  (0.002)  3.97E-5  (0.168) 
BTM  0.158   (0.118)  0.034   (0.795)  -0.183  (0.365) 
N  29  28  26 
2 R   0.321  0.458  0.321 
2 adj R   0.173  0.334  0.152 
Panel D. Poveda model with panel data 
INTERCEPT  -0.239   (0.023)  -0.351   (0.011)  -0.205   (0.288) 
?CF  1.709  (0.160)  3.175  (0.021)  0.513  (0.789) 
?AACC   2.295  (0.063)  3.005  (0.041)  0.216  (0.916) 
?NACC  1.846  (0.200)  4.003  (0.017)  2.579  (0.283) 
SIZE  1.29E-5 (0.403)  6.47E-5  (0.002)  4.22E-5  (0.125) 
BTM  0.107  (0.210)  0.097  (0.385)  -0.089  (0.575) 
N  36  36  34 
2 R   0.197  0.370  0.243 
2 adj R   0.063  0.265  0.107   28 
The results obtained when we analyse the two-year post-offering period are also 
consistent with the positive relationship between the reversion in discretionary accruals 
and underperformance in returns. In fact, similar to previous regressions in table 6, this 
positive relationship is even more pronounced when we focus on the two-year temporal 
horizon. In this case, the coefficient on  ?AACC is about 3.3, depending on the model 
used to estimate discretionary accruals, statistically significant at 5% level.  
Finally, for the three-year period following the offering, the  relationship 
between the reversion in discretionary accruals and abnormal returns is weak. Although 
the coefficient on discretionary accruals is positive, with three of the four estimation 
procedures it lacks statistical significance. Thus, it  would appear that pre-offering 
earnings management explains subsequent returns during the one and two-year period, 
but  then loses explicative power  with regards returns  over the three-year  period. 
However, these results must be interpreted with caution due to the limited sample size. 
In fact, in panel B of table 6, when we estimated regression (16) with a bigger sample, 
we noted how total current accruals were statistically significant in explaining long-run 
returns for the three-year post-issue period. 
As an alternative to these event-time regressions, we  can investigate the 
relationship between pre-offering earnings management and stock returns in the three 
year post-issue period  by applying the calendar-time approach. As  we explained in 
previous section, this procedure analyses the offering firms’ return over the three-year 
post-issue period by examining the strategy of holding a portfolio which is made up, in 
each calendar month, of the stocks of firms that have issued equity over the last 36 
months.  
Panel B of table 5 shows that the abnormal monthly mean return of the calendar 
portfolio is statistically negative. The idea is then to detect if there is any relationship 
between earnings management and this negative post-offering abnormal monthly mean 
returns. For that, terciles are formed by sorting sample firms based on the change in 
discretionary accruals in the three-year post-issue period and then, we apply the 
calendar-time approach to each tercile. If earnings management explains the  post-
offering negative abnormal returns, we would expect the tercile with greater decline in 
post-issue discretionary accruals to experience more negative abnormal returns.  
Table 8 reports the results of the calendar-time analysis by terciles. We apply the 
four alternative models  explained earlier  to estimate discretionary accounting 
adjustments. Panel A of table 8 displays the results obtained when the modified Jones 
model in cross-section is used to estimate abnormal accruals. The first tercile is made up 
of those issuing firms with greater declines in discretionary accruals in the three-year   29 
post-issue period. The abnormal monthly mean return of the calendar portfolio for this 
first tercile is -1.59%, statistically significant with a p-value of 4.9%. As for the second 
and third terciles, the abnormal monthly mean return  is also negative but it lacks 
statistical significance. Thus,  the  results in panel A  indicate that the decline in 
accounting accruals explains the abnormal returns in the post-offering years. When the 
modified Jones model is estimated with panel data, results are qualitatively similar. For 
the first tercile, the intercept from the Fama-French model is statistically negative with a 
p-value of 5.3%, whereas for the second and third terciles, the abnormal monthly mean 
return is negative but not significant. 
TABLE 8. 
ABNORMAL MONTHLY MEAN RETURN IN CALENDAR TIME REGRESSIONS 
 
This table reports the relationship between the abnormal monthly mean return for issuing firms and the 
abnormal accruals reversion. For this purpose, terciles were formed on the basis of this reversion and we 
applied the calendar-time regression to each tercile. 
 
  TERCILE 1  TERCILE 2  TERCILE 3 
Panel A. Modified Jones model in cross-section 
ˆ p a  from FF model  -1.59%  -0.70%  -0.60% 
t statistic  -1.972  -1.145  -1.198 
p-value  (0.049)  (0.252)  (0.231) 
Panel B. Modified Jones model with panel data 
ˆ p a  from FF model  -0.83%  -0.52%  -0.60% 
t statistic  -1.937  -0.923  -1.223 
p-value  (0.053)  (0.356)  (0.221) 
Panel C. Poveda model in cross-section 
ˆ p a  from FF model  -1.84%  -0.36%  -0.46% 
t statistic  -2.979  -0.727  -0.930 
p-value  (0.003)  (0.467)  (0.353) 
Panel D. Poveda model with panel data 
ˆ p a  from FF model  -1.19%  -0.41%  -0.21% 
t statistic  -2.061  -0.763  -0.502 
p-value  (0.039)  (0.445)  (0.616) 
 
Next, in panel C, we repeat the analysis using the Poveda model in cross-section 
to estimate discretionary accruals. The abnormal monthly mean return for the first 
tercile is -1.84%, highly significant with a p-value of 0.3%. With regards the second and 
third terciles, the intercept from the Fama-French model is negative but not statistically 
significant. So the results obtained are robust to a different procedure to estimate 
abnormal accruals and confirm that earnings management does seem to explain the 
negative abnormal returns in the three-year post-offering period. Finally, panel D shows   30 
the results obtained when the Poveda model is estimated with panel data. Again, the 
abnormal monthly mean return for the first tercile is negative and highly significant, 
whereas for the second and third terciles, it is negative but not significant.  
In summary,  the  results in this section show that long-run abnormal returns 
following the decision of issue equity are explained, at least in part, by the reversion of 
accounting practices to overstate earnings prior to the offering. 
 
6.   Conclusions 
An interesting puzzle in financial literature is stock price underperformance 
following equity issues. For Spanish rights issues, Pastor and Martin (2004) reported 
negative abnormal returns in the three-year post-issue period. In this study we analyse if 
rights  issuing firms  in Spain  manipulate earnings in order to influence  market 
perceptions of the firm’s value around the offering. We explore whether discretionary 
accruals are used to boost reported earnings before the issue and  if these earnings 
management practices are associated with the post-offering abnormal stock returns. 
We verify that discretionary accruals grow before the issue, peak in the offering 
year and decline thereafter. This accruals’ pattern around the offering is sustained when 
we adjust event firms’ accruals using control firms or sector medians. Moreover, these 
results are consistent  even when using alternative methodologies to estimate the 
abnormal component of accruals, thus confirming that the results are not due to model 
specification. 
We then attempt to discern if these accounting practices explain the 
underperformance in stock returns.  We  discover a  positive  relationship between the 
reversion in discretionary accruals and abnormal returns during the years following the 
equity issue. Moreover, these results are robust not only to the four different procedures 
to estimate managerial discretion, but also to the two alternatives to measure  post-
offering abnormal returns, the event-time and calendar time approaches. 
Therefore, the results obtained in this study appear to confirm that managers 
exploit the discretion allowed in accounting rules to o verstate earnings before the 
offering. Furthermore, i t seems that investors cannot see through these accounting 
practices, overvaluing issuing firms. When, in the subsequent periods, these accounting 
adjustments reverse  and high pre-issue earnings are not maintained, the market 
subsequently revalues the firm downwards.   31 
These conclusions are relevant not only for the academic community but also 
those who use accounting information, enabling them to take earnings management into 
consideration in their decision process. In addition, from the viewpoint of market 
regulators, they should examine the management of earnings closely around equity 
offerings to guarantee capital resources were properly allocated.   32 
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